Abstract. This paper describes some attacks on word-oriented stream ciphers that use a linear feedback shift register LFSR and a non-linear lter. These attacks rely on exploiting linear relationships corresponding to multiples of the connection polynomial that de ne the LFSR.
Introduction
This paper presents new attacks on word-oriented stream ciphers constructed from a linear feedback shift register LFSR and a non-linear lter NLF. These ciphers are constructed from operations on blocks of bits called words, where the length of a word is denoted by w. In particular this paper analyses what we call SOBER-like ciphers based on the SOBER family of ciphers 8, 12 14 and SSC-like ciphers as used in SSC 15 , and SSC-II 16 .
The LFSR of a SOBER-like cipher produces a stream fs t g of w-bit words using operations over the Galois eld of order 2 w , which is denoted GF2 w . The words s t are called L-words and the stream is called the L-stream. The L-words s 0 ; : : : ; s r,1 are initialised from the secret key some ciphers also initialise using a resynchronisation value. The remaining words are produced by iterating a linear recurrence s t+r = P r,1 i=0 i s t+i ; where i 2 GF2 w are constant, and multiplication and addition are performed over GF2 w . Addition over GF2 w is equivalent to bit-wise exclusive-OR XOR. The LFSR is represented by the connection polynomial: px = x r + P r,1 i=0 i x i ; where, once more, multiplication and addition are performed over GF2 w . The set of exponents of px with nonzero coe cients is called the LFSR tapset, denoted T. The LFSR of an SSClike cipher di ers in that it uses bit rotations rather than eld multiplications and is based on a bit-wise LFSR more details are given in Sect. 2 
. The vector
The L-stream is fed through an NLF to produce the N-stream fv t = F t g.
The words v t are called N-words. SOBER-like ciphers use an LFSR with a large state t , and the NLF relies on a small, xed subset of the words in t . That is, we can write v t = Fs t+ 1 ; : : : ; s t+ a ; where , = f 1 ; : : : ; a g f 0; : : : ; r , 1g, is the NLF tapset. SSC-like ciphers, on the other hand, use an LFSR with a small state, and the NLF relies on the entire state. SOBER-like ciphers use an LFSR, an NLF and a form of decimation called stuttering described in Sect. 3. The resulting stream, denoted fz n g, is the key stream. The stuttering chooses which N-words will be output to the key stream. The stuttering is intended to, and appears to, defeat attacks requiring large amounts of output, such as correlation attacks 4, 10 . However, the stuttering merely adds an almost constant factor to the complexity of the attacks described below.
In the analysis of stream ciphers based on bit-wise LFSRs, cryptanalysts found that attacks could be improved by exploiting linear relationships in the L-stream other than that expressed by the linear recurrence see for example 4, 6, 10 . Such linear relationships correspond to multiples of the connection polynomial: the polynomial rx = px qx = P a i=0 i x i , corresponds to a linear relationship of the form P a i=0 i s t+i = 0. For the remainder of the paper, a multiple refers to either a multiple of the connection polynomial or the linear relationship corresponding to that multiple. The main purpose of this paper is to provide examples of word-oriented stream ciphers for which the multiples can lead to low complexity attacks.
The rst example is a component of the word-oriented stream cipher SSC-II 16 . SSC-II consists of two half-ciphers producing streams that are XORed to form the output. One of these half-ciphers is based on a 4-word LFSR each word consists of 32 bits, with an NLF and no stuttering. The LFSR is based on a simple 127-bit, bit-wise linear recurrence that appears di cult to exploit due to the word-oriented structure of the NLF. However, a power of the bit-wise connection polynomial results in a linear relationship between corresponding bits of s t , s t+63 and s t+127 . This paper describes how this relationship can be exploited in an attack of complexity c2 41:7 against the LFSR-half cipher, where cN indicates that the complexity is expected to be a small multiple of N. The authors would like to emphasise that this attack on the half-cipher does not defeat the entire SSC-II cipher.
The attack on the SSC-II half-cipher is due to the bit-wise connection polynomial of the LFSR having extremely low w eight that is, a low n umber of terms. If the LFSR was based on a higher-weight connection polynomial, but there was some low-weight, low-degree multiple rx, then a similar attack could be applied using this multiple. The linear recursion over GF2 w in a SOBER-like cipher can be shown to be equivalent to implementing w parallel bit-wise LFSRs of length wr over GF2, see 9 . The constants i are chosen so that the bit-wise LFSR has many terms high weight. This property defeats attacks similar to the above attack, as well as defeating other attacks designed for stream ciphers employing bit-wise LFSRs. The most successful attacks against SOBER-like ciphers have been what we call guess-and-determine GD attacks 1 3, 7, 8, 12, 13 . These GD attacks are based on exploiting two relationships: the linear relationship between L-words described by the LFSR; and the relationship between L-words and the key stream de ned by the NLF. However, previous attacks have not exploited any further linear relationships.
The latest edition SOBER ciphers, the t-class 8 , contains three ciphers: t8, t16 and t32. The cipher t16 is currently being assessed for use in third generation" mobile communication systems, while t32 is being implemented for encryption in mail transfer sessions between e-mail servers. Thus far, our research i n to the t-class has not found any GD attacks exploiting further linear relationships that can decrease the complexity below that of previously known GD attacks. However, we h a ve observed that multiples can lead to low-complexity GD attacks on other SOBER-like ciphers. This is demonstrated by a dummy SOBER-like cipher, TIPSY, for which the best GD attacks exploiting only the LFSR and NLF have complexity c2 150 . Our search method found a GD attack exploiting further linear relationships for which the complexity is reduced to c2 117 .
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 1.1 introduces some de nitions. Section 2 describes the analysis of the LFSR half-cipher in SSC-II. Section 3 introduces GD attacks and the cipher TIPSY is analysed. Section 4 describes our method for nding GD attacks. Conclusions and areas for further research are discussed in Sect. 5.
De nitions
For any t 0, we de ne a candidate L-word u t to be a guess for the value of the L-word s t , and de ne a candidate state t = u t ; : : : ; u t+r,1 to be a guess for the value of t . We consider that an LFSR-based stream cipher is broken once the initial state of the LFSR has been determined. One method by which a stream cipher can be attacked is to search through every candidate t until the value of t is found this process is commonly known as guessing. A candidate state t is tested to see if it is correct by constructing a key stream using this value t , and comparing the resulting key stream with the observed key stream. If the two streams match then the candidate is correct. In general, the large size of the register and the corresponding large number of possible candidate states make a n y such attack prohibitive. Note that the half-word N-words vH t and vL t are functions of the half-words sH t+i and sL t+i , 0 i 3, using addition modulo 2 16 3 Guess-and-determine Attacks
The LFSRs of SOBER-like ciphers correspond to bit-wise connection polynomials with extremely large numbers of terms. For example, the LFSR of t16 has a corresponding bit-wise connection polynomial with approximately 136 terms. This property helps SOBER-like ciphers resist the kind of attack described in the previous section. The most successful attacks 1 3, 7, 14, 13, 12 against SOBERlike ciphers have been GD attacks there is no common name for these attacks.
The following example describes a dummy SOBER-like cipher which is used to demonstrate how GD attacks are performed, and how GD attacks can, in some cases, be improved by exploiting multiples. The linear recursion is of the form s t+13 = s t+4 +s t+1 + s t ; where = 0xEDED, and addition and multiplication are performed over GF2 16 . The corresponding connection polynomial is px = x 13 + x 4 + x + . The NLF is of the form: v t = Fs t ; s t+5 ; s t+10 ; s t+11 = fs t + s t+11 + s t+5 + s t+10 , where + denotes addition modulo 2 16 and f is a xed, nonlinear, one-to-one 16-bit S-box. TIPSY decimates the N-stream to form the key stream using the same stuttering as t16 the stuttering is described in Sect. 3.1.
As mentioned in Sect. 1.1, a stream cipher can be broken by guessing the value of any state t , but the large size of the register and the corresponding large number of possible candidate states make a n y such attack prohibitive. GD attacks guess only a small set of candidate L-words, rather than an entire state. These attacks then use some observed N-stream words, and the relationships resulting from the LFSR and the NLF, to determine an entire state from this smaller set of L-words. Example 2. In attacking TIPSY, if u t , u t+1 and u t+13 are guessed, then u t+4 can be determined as u t+4 = u t+13 +u t+1 + u t . Alternatively, i f u t+5 , u t+10 and u t+11 are guessed then u t can be determined from v t ; i f , denotes subtraction modulo 2 16 , then u t = f ,1 v t , u t+5 + u t+10 , u t+11 .
These two processes of determining L-words are called D-exploiting the LFSR and NLF respectively the`D' is for`determine'. Note that, for TIPSY, Dexploiting the LFSR and NLF is computationally equivalent t o c1 encryption.
The same applies to the t-class ciphers. D-exploiting the NLF is not a new concept: inversion attacks 6 and the generalised inversion attacks 5 are based on a similar approach.
Given a suitable portion of the N-stream, 1 previous GD attacks were based on guessing candidates for a small set of L-words, D-exploiting the LFSR and NLF to determine a full candidate state, and then testing this candidate state. These analyses of SOBER-like ciphers examined only those GD attacks that exploit the relationships explicitly de ned by the LFSR and NLF. This paper extends the range of GD attacks by D-exploiting further multiples. There are simply too many m ultiples to begin searching for all attacks exploiting all possible multiples. Consequently, a method has been developed for reducing the amount o f w ork by considering multiples that are more likely to lead to improved attacks: the rationale behind the authors' approach is described in Sect. 4. Using this method, the authors conducted a search for attacks exploiting polynomials of degree 2r twice the degree of px or less and with 10 or less terms. This method cannot be guaranteed to nd the best attack, as there may be some other highweight or high-degree polynomial which can be exploited in a low complexity attack. However, the existence of such an attack becomes more unlikely as the weight and degree of the polynomials increases.
When applied to the t-class ciphers, the analysis described in Sect. 4 revealed that the additional linear relationships did not provide an attack o f l o wer complexity than was already known. However, the analysis of TIPSY did nd improvements by exploiting further multiples. The lowest complexity GD-attack D-exploiting only the LFSR and NLF of TIPSY has complexity c2 128 , given a suitable portion of the N-stream. Using the method described in Sect. 4, the authors found the following attack of complexity c2 96 , given a suitable portion of N-stream, a signi cant improvement. To perform the attack, a portion of the N-stream must be observed, including v t+i , i 2 f4; 7; 11; 12; 17; 18; 22; 23g for some value of t. Let t denote the sixword candidate vector t = u t+12 ; u t+14 ; u t+15 ; u t+17 ; u t+22 ; u t+27 . For a given 1 The problem of obtaining a suitable portion of N-stream from the key stream is addressed in Sect. 3.1.
value of t , Steps 2 to 18 in Table 1 encryptions.
Note 2. This attack clearly exploits the property that TIPSY has two pairs of NLF taps which are 5 words apart, contravening criteria suggested by Golic 6 and L ohlien 11 .
Accounting for the Stuttering
The stuttering decimates the N-stream fv t g as follows. The rst output of the NLF v 1 is the rst stutter control word SCW. Each SCW is partitioned into eight pairs of bits each pair is called a dibit. Beginning with the least signi cant dibit, the stuttering reads the value of the dibit and performs one of four actions according to the value of the dibit. The actions corresponding to the dibits are shown in Table 2 . When all the dibits have been read, the LFSR is cycled, and the output of the NLF becomes the next SCW. The resulting stream, denoted fz n g, is the key stream.
The stuttering decimates the N-stream in a random manner, so that consecutive key-stream words may or may not be consecutive N-stream words. This results in some uncertainty in relating the position of N-words to position of key-stream words. Furthermore, this uncertainty increases with the distance in words between key-stream words. This helps defeat attacks which require large amounts of key stream, such as correlation attacks. However, the stuttering does not add much resistance against GD attacks. The next SCW will v t+20 . The attacker can assume that for some value of t, not only is v t+3 of the above form, but v t+20 is also of the form v t+20 = : : : ; 01; 10, If this is the case, then the next key-stream words are z n+8 = v t+22 and z n+9 = v t+23 0x6996.
Thus, assuming that the values of the SCWs are correct, the attacker is able to determine the N-words from the key stream, and perform the attack i n Example 3. There are two obstacles. First, the attacker does not know when the SCWs have these values, and second, the attacker does not even know where in the key stream the SCWs occur. As a result, the attacker proceeds through the key stream assuming that each sequence of 10 key-stream words was derived from the N-stream using the SCWs in Example 4, and performs the steps in Example 3 until the correct state is found. Let N denote the data complexity, equal to the number of times that the process in Example 3 is repeated. The expected value of N is the inverse of the probability that a random portion of key stream was obtained from the N-stream using the SCWs in Example 4. This probability is determined as follows. Firstly, consider the probability that the rst key-stream word is the rst word output by an SCW. There are an average of 6 key-stream words output for every SCW, so this is 1=6. Secondly, ignoring the requirement that v t+4 be an SCW, the values of v t+4 and v t+20 are of the correct form in this example with probability 2 ,18 . The combined probability is 1 c2 128 , given the N-stream would correspond to an attack of process complexity c2 150 , when considering the stuttering.
Searching for GD Attacks
This section provides a brief description of the authors' method of searching for GD attacks. In this section, the tapset of any polynomial rx = P r+k i=0 i x i , i s de ned to be T rx = fi : i 6 = 0 g, and the number of non-zero coe cients of rx equal to jT rx j is called the weight of rx. 2 A GD attack is de ned by a set of steps where the LFSR, the NLF and other multiples are D-exploited to determine a candidate state from a small set of candidate L-words. It is the tapsets of the LFSR, NLF and multiples that determine which candidate L-words can be determined from a given set of candidate L-words. Thus, the existence of a GD attack i s determined by the tapsets of the LFSR, NLF and multiples, and not other details of the relationship such as the coe cients. In the case of a bit-wise LFSR, nding the tapsets for the multiples is simple because the tapsets of the the factors px and qx de ne the polynomials and hence de ne the tapset of the product rx = px qx. However, in a word-oriented LFSR, there can be many factors qx with the same tapsets but di erent coe cients for which the products px qx have di erent tapsets. This adds signi cant complication to the search for GD attacks. In addition to this complication, there is a very large set of multiples and their tapsets. Consequently, the task of searching for the optimal GD attack the GD attack o f l o west complexity is still an open problem.
The search for GD attacks can be approached from two directions. One approach i s t o h a ve a growing set of multiples to exploit, where the search program constantly tests for all multiples that can be D-exploited given the set of L-words that are currently known. This approach has not yet been implemented, although the authors are in the process of developing such a program.
The second approach divides the search i n to two parts: a polynomial search, that determines a set of multiples B to exploit; and a B-attack search, that examines the GD attacks exploiting the NLF and the polynomials in B. The set B is called an GD basis and is always assumed to contain px. Note that for a given T 0 , all these multiples rx will share some similar characteristics. There will be some coe cients of rx which will be certain to be zero in the zero positions, there will be some coe cients which will be certain to be nonzero in the nonzero positions, and the remaining coe cients could be either zero or nonzero, depending on the cancellation of terms in the expansion of px qx, the zero-or-nonzero positions. From these sets of coe cients we can determine a superset of the possible tapsets for multiples px qx with T qx = T 0 , b y considering all possible combinations of the nonzero positions and the zero-or-nonzero positions. The polynomial search only considers those tapsets with weight less than the bound W. F or each resulting tapset, the polynomial search conducts tests for redundancy, and then con rm that the tapset corresponds to a multiple pxqx with T qx = T 0 . This requires less processing than determining if the tapset corresponds to a multiple and then conducting the tests for redundancy. The greatest restriction on the authors' polynomial search i s the weight o f the tested multiples. Our fastest algorithm employed xed arrays containing the subsets of b elements from a set of a elements. This method worked best for us. As a and b increases, the necessary storage requirements increase signi cantly, placing constraints on a and b. The authors restricted the polynomial search t o nding multiples of degree less than 2r twice the degree of px and weight 1 0 or less. The tests for redundancy then reduced this set of multiples. Given these restrictions, the polynomial search and B-attack search require less than a day of processing each.
Results
The polynomial search on the LFSR of TIPSY found 123 multiples within the above constraints maximum degree D = 26 = 2r and maximum weight W = 10. Using this basis, the B-attack search found an attack o n TIPSY of complexity c2 96 ignoring stuttering: this is the attack described in Example 3. Given the improved attack on TIPSY, the authors considered that t-class might also weaker than rst claimed. A polynomial search on the LFSR of t16 was conducted to nd the GD basis B within the aforementioned constraints maximum degree D = 34 = 2r and maximum weight W = 10. This search revealed a GD basis of 63 multiples. The B-attack search using this basis found only GD-attacks of complexity c2 160 ignoring stuttering. Such attacks o er no improvement o ver previous GD attacks such attacks are simple variants of the attacks in 2, 7 , discussed in 8 . A similar analysis of t8 and t32 revealed that the additional linear relationships did not provide an attack o f l o wer complexity than was already known.
Conclusion
This paper provides two examples of how m ultiples can be exploited in attacks against various word-oriented ciphers. In the rst example, powers of the bitwise connection polynomial reveal a weakness in SSC-II. This supports the wellknown criteria that stream ciphers even word-oriented stream ciphers should avoid using connection polynomials for which there exists low-degree, low-weight multiples. In the second example, multiples of the connection polynomial over GF2 w are used in a low complexity GD attack against a dummy SOBER-like cipher, TIPSY. However, the t-class ciphers appear to resist attacks exploiting multiples. The authors continue to examine how m ultiples can be exploited against SOBER-like ciphers, and consider how SOBER-like ciphers resist such attacks. It is hoped that this will lead to a method of determining the best possible GD attack on a given SOBER-like cipher.
